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1. INTRODUCTION 
The work of Averch and Johnson initiated a period of great 
interest in examining the effects of the structure of utility regulation
upon the input choices made by the affected firms. Since their work, 
the literature on the "A-J effect" has included refinements and 
extensions of the A-J model itself, as well as discussion about the
underlying concepts of regulation which the A-J model implies. The
issues of the structure of regulation and the choices made by the 
regulated firm remain topical. This paper is within the spirit of
that examination but the ·structure which is to be explored is of 
relatively recent concern: large increases in the cost of petroleum
products have made the fuel cost adjustment mechanism, (F.AM) or 
fuel-cost-pass-through, an important institutional development 
deserving of our attention. Economic intuition suggests that the 
fuel adjustment mechanism has a potential to distort input choices_
of the regulated firm. 
The relationship between a fuel adjustment clause and 
input choice is likely to be sensitive not only to the mechanics
of the fuel adjustment clause itself but also to the underlying
regulatory process to which it is applied. The question of how 
regulators really behave is itself a continuing subject for debate 
 
�d diacu••i� . And, '' go� wt'hou' •aying, ac,ual l., l•'I'• of 
behavior may differ from the formula rules of the regL1a loJ,, prJ 
This paper examines F.AM in two different mo�esto 
regulation. The first is based upon Joskow's [1974] Lodel bf 
regulatory behavior. The second is patterned after tle Jro�ess 
formalized in a California Public Utilities Commissioh tlri�f. 
The organization of the paper is as follows l Jed:ion 
2 d .  h h .  · · · s   3 iscusses reasons w y t is topic is important. ection 
incorporates a fuel adjustment mechanism into a regulltojy 
originally used by Burness, Montgomery and Quirk [197i] jo exa 
the "turnkey " era in nuclear power plant construction ! Jecl:ion 
examines a similar mechanism in a model of regulatory lbeJavior 
derived from a "real world" fuel adjustment tariff. SecJioih. 5 
contains a discussion of the multi-period effects of l fjellcost 
pass through program on regulatory activity, and SectJon !6 wrovia 
some conclusions and interpretations. 
The results obtained here may be considered! some' 
surprising. In the tradition of Averch and Johnson l�telat 
'he papec eaam<n., inpu' dia,oc'i�a which �y r�ul'
I 
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particular institutional innovation. The principal result
such distortions is clear-cut. Furthermore this potehtill
evident in both regulatory models. However, in some hasls, 
biases can not be interpreted directly as leading to l mJre 
. . .- . And h 1 . . ti lh intensive input mix. , t e resu ts are sensitive o t e 
regulatory model chosen. 
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2. FUEL COST ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS IN PERSPECTIVE 
After scores of connnents upon and refinements of the A-J 
model, the most telling criticism has been that the institution 
depicted in A-J structure does not reflect the way the regulatory 
process really operates. In a 197 4 article, Joskow contends that 
11the evidence presented so far • • • appears to contradict the 
conception of regulation on which the A-J model is based. " 
Specifically, in Joskow's regulatory world, utility 
connnissioners tend not to initiate rate of return reviews as long as 
nominal output prices remain stable. Thus, in periods of decreasing 
costs, regulated firms will not want regulatory review, as the 
decreasing costs (relative to the old nominal price) allow the firm 
to increase its rate of return. On the other hand, regulated firms 
will initiate regulatory reviews during periods of increasing costs. 
The Joskow model is important as an historical description 
of electric utility regulation in the United States. The 1950s and 
early 19 60s apparently were a period of a regulatory equilibrium. 
3 
The equilibrium was then subjected to two external shocks: (1) sharply 
increasing costs for inputs: capital and (especially) fuel; and 
(2) rising environmental requirements as groups concerned with 
environmental quality conquered the.necessary organization costs and 
began to influence the electric utility regulatory process. 
Against the background of these changes, just as Joskow 
predicted, the fuel cost adjustment has become an increasingly 
popular institution among participants in the regulatory process. 
Tobl• 1 shows the 43 states which, in �• fo� lr"' 
. . 1 . ·1· . ·1· FAM c l" lf I.are permitting e ectric uti ities to uti ize a • a � orni 
included in this list, and that state's pollution authorjtieb 
in the past two years tightened the air pollution regulajion b 
sulfur emissions. I These new air quality standards can be achieved inlm 
but there are two polar choices representing primary reljance 
different factor inputs. Utilities may (1) invest in suJstaht 
capital "chnology in the fo� of stack scrubbers; or (2)1 pl 
very clean (low sulfur content) fuel oil, at a price even hi�h 
th• alr•ady dr�tically increased pri� for f�l oil �eJ in l a 
with more lax environmental standards [FPC, 1977]. TherJ are 
conflicting estimates of the costs of scrubber technologJ [Hln 
Helgeson, 1976.], [Leo and Rossoff, 1978]. 
However, Southern California utilities have, tip tb 
point, relied almost exclusively on the "fuel intensive " lapplo 
meeting the clean air standards. 
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The motivation for the present research is straighlf can the existence of the fuel adjustment mechanism be alJering 
incentives for electric utilities to choose one form of Jo11lt1on 
control strategy over another? However, the application J ofl tlis 
ch tl 
rward
the 
question go beyond pollution control in urban areas. If ,poten 
distortions are suggested, the FAM �y also be affecting
l
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TABLE 1 
STATES HAVING FUEL ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS 
FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY RATES 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
*California 
*Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
*Florida 
Georgia 
**Hawaii 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts
Michigan 
**Minnesota 
�*Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
*New York 
**North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
**Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
* South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
District of Columbia 
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Source National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners , 1976 
-�Report on Utility and Carrier .Regulation. States listed are-­
those denoted by NARVC as having regulatory agencies which "allow 
periodic adjustments for changes in average cost of fuel." States 
denoted by "**" are rtot listed by NARVC as having "automatic adjustment 
clauses". States denoted by "*" are listed as having "automatic 
adjustment clauses" but with a NARVC footnote that these states , to 
varying degrees , reserve to their regulatory agencies some discretion 
and/or oversight with regards to the "automatic " workings of the 
mechanism. 
i 
on regulatory rules , there are different incentives that fapp�ylto 
diffmnc ceohnologio• , d� to diffedng degrm of "f�
I 
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I 3. A TWO PERIOD MODEL OF FAM BIA S IN A THEORETICAL REGmkTORY ENVIR1 
Montgomery and Quirk [1977] have developed a slmpJe·model 
that is patterned after Joskow's [1974] observations. TJis be�tion 
uses that model to demonstrate that the single institutilnaJ c�ange 
adding a fuel oo•t adj�<m�t �oh�1'm � oa�e differ!., rrtducti 
input incentives when the firm faces uncertainty over thl futu e co l l
of fuel.1 
This is considered a "Joskow model " because of [its u 
conception of the regulatory process. The utility regulatojs 
model are concerned particularly with both nominal outpub pJic
profits. Rather than constantly monitoring the rate of letjrn
set a nominal price formula in period zero. They do not suJse 
react even if the firm's rate of return rises , as long as tJe 
continues to set prices by the approved formula. The oplraJiv· 
o�traint , from the vi� of both the fi� and the regulf to� 
commission , is that the firm must earn nonnegative profits. 
We suppose a two-period world. Period. zero islhisto 
irm 
it may be thought of as "the previous period." The firm � a lrekula 
monopolist , faces uncertainty in the sense that it does iot 
I price of fuel in period one , the "next period. " The position 
knbw th'. 
f tJ
demand curve is the same in both periods. The firm must lchJos 
ex ante (that is , before the price of fuel in period one i w ,I dm be 
observed) a level of capital , K , for period one. After l ij realiz 
6 
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the firm chooses an optimal amount of fuel input, L*, so as to satisfy
the common carrier requirement 
F(K,L*) � Q (P) (3.1) 
where P is the price of the firm's output in period one. Q (P) is a
negatively sloped market demand schedule that is the same in all 
periods. 
The firm cannot freely set the price, P, for period one, but 
it can adjust P to the extent allowed by a FAM problem. 
The foregoing sketches a simple, two stage dynamic programming
problem. The firm will choose an ex ante optimal amount of capital, 
with the assumption that it will choose an optimal amount of fuel ex 
post. 
The regulatory environment for this model may be described
by the following assumptions: 
Model A 
Assumption A.l. The firm is constrained to a common carrier
requirement, Q (P) < F(K,L). 
Assumption A.2. There is no storage available either to the 
firm or to purchasers. 
Assumption A.3. The utility regulators have set a base 
price in the previous period, P0• Either this price remains unchanged
P = P0, or the price is allowed to adjust according to fuel adjustment
mechanism (FAM). 
Assumption A.4. The utility regulators will 
one to insure that the firm earns nonnegative profits. 
chooses an ex ante optimal K = K. Then if the realized 
cost of fuel, w, is so high that 
PQ (P) - wL (K,Q) - rK. < o
the utility regulators set P at P' such that 
P'Q (P') - wL (K,Q) - rK = 0
We will define w (K) as' {w j PQ (P) - wL - rK = O}
aL in 
Jhe lfi 
l1ul 
Assumption A.5. Demand is inelastic (-1 <ri (Q) <:o 
Assumption A.6. There exists a c.d.f. � (w), for £ue 
in period one, and � (w0) = 0 (with certainty, fuel costs wiJl· 
not decrease, so w� w0). The firm will be assumed to purcJas 
inputs in a competitive manner, exhibiting no monopsonis bic ba 
influence over input prices. 
First, assume that ther is no FAM. Since resources 
costless, it will never pay the firm to produce more th� tJe
demanded, so we can substitute Q (P) for F(K,L*) in the plof�t
 and rewrite L* as a function of K and Q, 
L* = L (K,Q)
The utility commission has set P0 = P0 = P, and hence Q (P) 1 Q 
allows us to suppress the dependence of L (.) on Q, so thlt Il* 
In the absence of a FAM the objective for the risk neturll, le 
I profit maximizing firm is to 
erio 
f th 
(3.31 
(3.41 
pri 
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ecte l
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Max E (1f) 
K 
w (K) 
= J {PQ - wL (K) - rK}d<P
0 
+[00 {P'Q (P') - wL (K) - rK}d<P
w (K) 
subject to K � 0, L � 0. 
(3.5) 
The second integral is identically zero by definition, so
(3.5) reduces to 
w (K) 
M:x E (1f) = J {PQ - wL (K) - rK}d<P
0 
subject to K � O, L � 0. 
(3. 6) 
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we will assume that
the firm's production function F (K,L) is a well behaved neoclassical
function: F is strictly quasiconcave. FK > 0, FL > O, FKL � O, 
FLL. � O, FKK .$ 0. 
F (O,O) F (K,O) F (O,L) o.
lim FK =+� K+O 
l.im FL = + oo L+O 
An optimal solution to (3.6) will always satisfy K > 0, L > 0.
Then, the first order conditions for a maximum are 
w (K) 
f- 'il L w a - r}d<P 0 K 0 (3.7) 
9 
or 
w (K) 
f {-w �i}dtji 
0 
rtji (w (K))
totally differentiating the common carrier constraint,
re.arranging yields 
FK 'ill - FL 
= 'ilK 
and, substituting (3.9) into (3.8)
w (K) 
f {w :K}d<P 
O L 
<P (w (K)) = r
We can interpret this as saying 
capital rental rate equal to the conditional 
F F 
w F
K' where the conditional expectation over w __.!is 
L FL 
F 
value of w F� given that w is less than w (K). Of
certainty case, w = w, <P (w) = 1 and the firm sets 
FK - r
FL
=�
Now, suppose the regulatory agency allows the
use of a FAM. 
I 
11 
(3,. 
(3.,  
(3.rnm 
We consider two types of FAMs.2 
FAM l" p
L1 (w-w ) 
• = p + 0 0 Q 0 
. FAM 2: P
·---
wL · -wOLO. 1 Po+ Qo 
where Li is the labor chosen in period 1. 
In either case; che firm will seek to maximize 
w (K) 
M�x E (n) = J {P Q - wL1 - rK}d<l>WO 
11 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
Appendix 1, discusses conditions under which a firm, having
chosen K = K, and observed w � w, c.an .and will choose L1 equal to 
L* satisfying: 
F (K,L*) 
( L* (w-w0)) Q Po + Qo 
thus defining L* as L (w,K). Appendix 2, states conditions such
that the concept of w (K) remains well defined where, as above,
w (K) =· {wl PQ (P) - wL (w,K) - rK = O}. 
Each of the two FAM formulas are examined separately.
FAM 1 
For FAM 1, the first order conditions are as follows:
w (K) 
_ J { .9.Q2_
 aL [ 'aQ (P) Cw -wo) aL aL J 
} O - (w-w0) QO 'aK + P --ai?' � TK  - w aK r d<l> (3.13) 0 
o =J
w CK{) -aL [ 
'aK w -
0 
(w-w0)Q (P) aQ (P) (w-wo) 
J _ ----:::-=--- - P 'aP Q Qo o 
which simplifies to
w (K) 
0 =f {- �[ [Q (P) + p .£gQll (w _ ] 'aK w- 'aP J w0) o Qo -
Totally differentiating the common carrier constraint
strict equality) 
F (K,L (w,K)) 
( L (w,K) (w-w0) ) Q Po+ Q 
which implies that 
aL 
0 
aL aq (w -wo) .£.!:.FK + FL aK = 'aP Qo 'aK
FK - 'aK = 
FK< ­
'aQ (P) (w -w0) - FLFL --aP- __ Q_o 
_ 
So, letting n be the elasticity of demand (3.15)
J
w (K){ 
aL 
[ Q [l+n] (w-wo)l } 
0 
- 'aK L - Qo J d<l> = r<l> (w (K)).
d<J> .. (3.1 
5) 
16) 
17) 
18)
Since demand is inelastic, as long as w > w0 then 
w - _g_ [l+n] [w-w0] < wQo 
so that (3.17) and (3.18) can be comb:ined and rewritten as: 
w(K) 
I 
FK w d<PF 0 L r < <P(w(K)) 
Therefore it is no longer true that the firm sets the 
F 
conditional expectation of ·{w F�} equal to r, except in the
degenerate case in which w = w0 with certainty. 
FAM 2
13 
(3.19) 
Similar calculations for FAM 2 yield first order conditions 
0 
where 
t) {- ;�� _ Q[�: nl •] _ r} .,0 
aL - ClK = 
FK 
2.9.fil (.!!!_) FL - aP Qo 
FK < -FL 
(3.20) 
Rearranging this gives us 
w(K)F 
;r: < r (w _E)d<P 
Jo FL 
<P(w(K)) 
I 
Again, the firm no longer sets the conditional expectatidn or 
equal to r, except.when w = w0 with certainty. 
These conditions can be directly related to the wo!rl 
(3. 2IL 
FK jj w FL
in 
there is no uncertainty over fuel costs. Let w = w,.w >[w0 ,i with 
certainty. Then· (3.19) and (3.21) become 
or 
FK A r <- w F . L 
F
4- < _Ew FL 
if optimal profits are nonnegative at w. This clearly .diverge 
from the criterion used by a firm that minimizes the �osbs df t 
producing the same amount of output which is to set�= F
IK 
• w L 
With a quasiconcave production function the fi� w1l.l 
< 
FK I FL Q; FAM
FK I FL Q; No FAM 
(3.2� 
(3.2!31 
set 
Furthermore, if the firm's production function lis homothe 
in the case of no uncertainty the capital/fuel ratio for a f lir 
with the FAM will be less than or equal to the capital/foel lraiio f0 
ch 
15 
the firm without the FAM even when the output effects are considered
(with the FAM, the utility will, usually, produce a lower output 
than without. The two exceptions are of course the case of completely
inelastic demand, and the case where w = w0). 
Unfortunately, the clean cut interpretation above (when 
there is no uncertainty) does not extend to a world with uncertainty.
Suppose that with no FAM, the firm chooses K = K1 and that with a FAM
it chooses K = K2• Then, the following obtains: 
w(Kl\, J{w F Kl}d<i> 
WO Ll 
ip(w(K1)) � 
w(K2)F J{w FK2}dipWO L2 
ip(w(K2))
Unless w(K1) = w(K2), we cannot directly compare the 
marginal rates of substitution for any given fuel price, w. One 
(3.25) 
case in which w(K1) = w(K2) is the naive regulatory environment in which
a regulatory agency intends �Qt to guarantee the zero .profit condition. 
Then, the utilities must maximize expected profits over all possible 
states of the world, This yields the following inequali.ty 
J
oo FK EK 
{w(__::i -__£)}dip < 0FL FL 
w 1 2 0 
(3. 25) 
so that, on a set of fuel prices S � [w0., 00] of positive measure, 
-
K2 
FK� F 
I FL w 2': lf"L w for w e: s. This inequality is strict except he 
degenerate case of w = w0 with certainty. Since it is not, �n 
general true that w(K1) = w(K2), I �resent in Appendix 3 la lbn�er 
interpretation of the input incentives. 
1 
Both FAMs cause a departure from the cost minil\dzing 
conditions for a firm with neither FAM nor a zero profitlco�ttaint' 
The cost minimizing problem then becomes 
CX) 
mtnf (wL + rK)dip 
The first order condition is 
r = 
WO 
CX) 
J' {w �K }dip FL WO
4. FAM BIAS IN A FORMAL REGULATORY SETTING 
The previous results demonstrate that, in a particular 
regulatory model, there exists a potential for input bias dul clo the 
existence of the fuel cost adjustment mechanism. As was notld,I the 
model was based upon a perception of the way regulators abtull 
behave. This section examines the effects of a particulal v lrs�on d 
FAM that is embedded in a model based upon how one group bf ledulat I
17 
claim to behave. The source of the conceptualization of this FAM and 
the regulatory process is of a tariff for the FAM used by a large 
California electric utility. There are two striking differences 
between this tariff and the Burness, Montgomery, and Quirk model. 
First, the FAM operates between formal rate reviews. Second, the 
mechanism for instantaneous activation of a nonnegative profits 
provision is not apparent. Because the Model A is easily adapted to 
remove the profit constraint, the interaction between the fuel 
adjustment mechanism and the rate of return review is more intriguing. 
To accomplish requires a multiper iod regulatory model. This model 
called Model B incorporates the following three concepts: 
Model B: 
Throughout this section, the conditions that demand is 
inelastic (A.5), that the firm faces a common carrier constraint 
(A.l) and that the firm has a well behaved neoclassical production 
function will be assumed. 
Assumption B.2: 
A Record Period. At time t = O, a base price, P0, 
for output has been set a priori for the firm. The 
utility cannot influence the price in the record 
period, but the decisions it makes will influence 
allowed prices in future periods. 
Assumption B.3: 
FAM or Fuel Periods. In periods 1 • • •  T-1, the 
base price, P0, is adjusted according to a fuel 
cost adjustment formula of the following type 
pt 
L (w - wO) 0 t Po + Qo<Po > t 1, • • •  , T-1
where L0 
demanded 
and Q0 (P0) are the fuel input and quanti�y 
respectively, in the record period; w I is t 
the fuel price in period t. 
Assumption B.4: 
A Review Period. In period T, the firm has a �ew pr1ce 
set by the rate of return formula 
PT 
WTLl� + sK0
Q* 
where s is the allowed rate of return, K0 is tHe cap 
input in the record period, and L* and Q* are Jrbi lr 
fuel and quantity functions whose form will be ;chobe 
tal 
ry 
l� 
J 
( 
under various assumptions in the remainder of this slction 
The crucial difference between Models A and B ls tha noj 
<he ra<e uf re<u� �d nu< <he reru prufi< ouu•<rain< i' l "pjra 
The 'firm will always be assumed to face uncertain fuel pricj i 
periods t = 1, 2, • • •  ,T with w > w0 with certainty. 
ive.
t -
First, the separate effects of only a fuel adjllstnien 
clause and only a rate of review mechanism are each complred with 
the " institutionless" case (no FAM and no rate review). I Thjn the 
combined system, incorporating both the fuel adjustment clajse land 
the rate of return review is compared with each. 
The following new assumptions will flesh oµt tlie model: 
Assumption A. 6. The firm will be required to choose a 
single capital level K = K0 = K1 = . • •  = �· 
Assumption A.7. In the introductory exposition, I said 
that the review period price was assumed to be set as 
PT 
WTL* + sK
Q* 
The following assumptions are introduced about ·L* and Q*. 
Q* = Q(PT-1) 
L* satisfies F(K,L*) = QT-1 
19 
Heuristically, the regulators go to their most recent past 
fuel use· and output data, but they refuse to accept "goldplated" fuel 
purchases in period QT-l into the rate calculations. In periods 
t = 1, • • •  T - 2 there is no incentive for the firm to goldplate 
fuel nor to produce more than the quantity demanded. This assumption 
makes the same true for period T - 1. 
The task facing the risk neutral firm is to 
Max 
K. 
t-1 - - t -P0F(K,L0) - w0L0 - rK + E A E (P F(K,L ) t=l t t t 
- T - -- wtLt - rK) + A ET(PTF(K,LT) - wTLT - rK)
subject to F(K,Lo) .: Q(Po) 
F(K,L1) '.: Q(P1) 
F.(K, LT) _: Q (PT) 
where E. ( · ) is the expectation operator and A is the discount J 
A three-period version of this model will servl tJ d 
the results. Period 0 is the record period, Period 1 is l thJ F 
Period 2 is the rate review period. Because resources are dos 
common carrier constraint will hold with strict equalityjintpe 
and 2, and we can write L. = L(Q.,K), j = 1, 2. Define � i 
(PtQt - wtLt - rtK), and �ate th�t since demand is inelai:ic,
The record period optimization problem for the expected lncjme 
firm can then be written: 
Max L 
K,L0 
P0F(K,L0) - w0L0 - rK + A1E1(P1Q1(P1) - w1L1(�1,�) 
2" 
:::�mt:: 
,.lk�,. 
ly, ' 
iodJ 
1f t >j1 m p -
�x�a.ldng 
rK.) 
+ A2E2(P2Q2(P2) � w2L2(Q2,K) - rK) + µ(F(K,Lo� - 1Q<fo)). .4) 
the 
Let us first consider an 1 1institutionless 11 wo:r;l' d in lwhicn 
- - - I firm has fixed PO = P0,.P1 = P1, P2 = P2 • The Kuhn rrucke 
necessary conditions for a maximum are 
0 p FL 0 0 WO + µFL 0 "l!'.1.
5) 
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( ClL1 ) ( ClL2 ) 0 = P F-- r + A E -w -- r + A. E -w --=-- r + µF-0 K 1 1 1 CJK 2 2 2 ClK K (4.6) 
0 (F(K,Lo) - Qo)µ (4.7) 
which gives us the result that 
( FK_\ = 
( ClL1 \ . ( ClL2 ) r -Al El -wl ClK - r/ - J..�E2; -w2 ClK - r
:Jf d L NO FAM WO 
NO R/R 
Now, consider a regulatory environment in which the fuel
period output price is adjusted according to a fuel adjustment 
mechanism, but .in which there is no rate of return review. 
In this case, the first order conditions reduce to 
r - J.. E -w -_ - r - J..2E2 -w --:-- r
(4.8) 
(:�) ,:. 
( ClL1 ) ( CJL2 )1 1 1 ClK 2 ClK (Cln1 (wl -wo1) (4.9) wO-AlEl ClPl �} 
To compare the record period marginal rate of substitution
when a FAM is available (4.9) and when neither a FAM nor a rate of 
return review is utilized (4.8), notice that neither the price of 
fuel in the record period, w0, nor the rental of capital, r, change.
The denominator of (4.9) contains an additional non-positive term 
(4.10). 
A E Cln 1 o ( ( w - w - 1 1, ClP1 Qo )) (4 
If this term is strictly negative either 1) tHe recdrd 
period marginal rate of substitution with a FAM (4.9) is 
lgreltdr tha 
in the institutionless case (4 .8) 
. (1R) FLO FAM > (:�J NO FAMNO R/R 
or 2) the numerator of (4.8) is larger than the numeratoi ofl (4.9) 
(or perhaps both). The second possibility reduces to (4 Jll) 
[A.1El ( wl ::l - r) ( 
FK _ + A2E2 w2 FL2 r)] No 
No 
FAM. RVR 
1 1 1 FL I L JJ •AM < lx E (w 
FK - r\ + A.2E2 (w2 :K - r\l 
1 2 F=• 
In•qualicy (4.11) ••ya Chae che fi�'' weighced (by di••l�1 "'h•d" 
•um of �p•oCed (w :· - r) will be gr•aC•r w<ch FAM. Thln.J. 
L 
of 
E1 (-) as j7-)d<ll(w1) and E2( • ) as J00 j (-)d<ll(w1)d<ll(w2) l 'Jlhe l abo 
WO WO WO 
would require that 
1) 
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FK F-> K FL. - FL. J FAM J !No FAM
w No R/R
w 
for either CL 1 or j 2, over some set of fuel prices of positive
measure. 
If the production function is homothetic, we get the 
following stronger Proposition (proof in Appendix 4). 
Proposition 1 
If expression (4.10) is strictly negative, at least one
of the following two statements is true 
1)
(::)FAM > (:K)No FAML NO R/R 
and the firm uses absolutely and relatively more fuel in the record
period with a FAM. 
f1 FK ) > 2) El 
\
wl FLl FAM 
El (•i :�l) NO FAMNO R/R 
This says that with with homotheticity, either the period
zero· use of fuel is greater with FAM, or that over some set of 
positive measure of period 1 fuel prices 
(:�) 1 FAM
wl 
> (:: ) 1 NO FAMNO R/Rwl 
A similar comparison can be made between the
marginal rate of substitution in the institutionless 
in the case in which there is a "rate of return" review 
3 (4.12). 
(::) R/R 
r - A. E (-w 
aLl -r) - ;\ E ((-w 
aL2 -r) +1 1 1 aiZ 2 2 2 aiC 
WO 
In this case, the denominators are the same 
aP 
key term is �2 which appears in the numerator of (4.12) aK 
in the expression for the case in which there is 
aP 
Analytically, the� expression isaK 
or 
aL1 
--=-+sw2 aK 
Ql 
F-_.!._ +s-w2 F Ll 
Ql 
riod
and 
d tw 
( 4! 2) 
which may be either positive or negative. This ambiguity of sign
stems from the fact that increasing initial capital decreases L1
the fuel needed in period one. Price in period two is a function
both of K and of L • 1 
ClP 
In the case in which -::J. is positive, one obtains a ClK 
"pro-capital" bias in the first order conditions analagous to the 
"pro-fuel" bias found with just a FAM, that is, at least one of 
the following two conditions is true: 
(1) 
(2) 
> 
_L < _.! (F- ) (F- ) 
�LO R/R 
- . 
FLO NO FAM
NO R/R
rlEl wl(::l - r
) 
+>2E2 (•2 ::2 - r)] 
[AlEl w1(:K - r) 11 + A2E2 (w2 :K - r
)
] 12 
No FAM 
No R/R
R/R 
()p 
If -=1 is negative, the opposite results hold. ()K 
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Finally, compare the results from the "institutionless", "FAM
only " and "rate of return and only" models to a world in which the 
utility has access both to the FAM and to the rate of return mechanism 
above. With both a FAM and a rate review, the relevant Kuhn-Tucker 
necessary conditions for a maximum are: 
0 
0 
_ ( Cln (wl-wO )) POF10 - wO + AlEl ()pl � +·'A2E2 ( 
Cl1f2 ()p 2 ) ClP2 at0 
( 'dL ) - -w 1 P F-- r + A E 1 --=-- r O K 1 1 ClK + . A2E2 
0 = µ(F(K ,Lo) - Q(Po)) 
( d1T2 ()�2 -
'dP2 'dK 
which gives us the condition that 
( ClL1 ) . [FR)= r - AlEl -wl a"f - r - A2E2 
� (�(� -�)) ° FAM WO - AlEl F -Q--R/R 1 0 
( 'd n2 'dP2 - w2 'dP 2 ClK (
Cl� 
)J Cl1f2 ___g 
- A2E2 ( 'dP2 ()�o I 
Obviously , the difference between the marginal rate! o
substitution in (4.14) and in the institutionless case .(JS) lis 
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(4. 
;J�m 
(4.1 
ambiguous. However, note that these ambiguities manifest lthemselves 
in some subtle ways in addition to the combined effects of 
independent FAM and rate of return distortions. 
1. 
Cl ClP 
The term - A2E2 ( 1f
2(�)) appears for the first !time. ClP2 oL0 I This is a direct interaction term. It simply ca,tures 
the effect that the FAM allows the firm to affect oulput 
in period 1 (the fuel period). This change feedJ in lo 
2. 
3. 
the price in period 2 (the rate of return period) 
the rate of return mechanism. The . 
CJPL sign bf CJLo is 
ambiguous, because L0 affects the period 2 price 
p2 
w2L1 (Q1,K.) + sK 
Ql 
via 
both through the numerator and denominator via Q1.
CJP2 The expression for -=­CJK 
CJP2 =aR 
w2 aL1(Q1,K.) + s
CJK 
Ql 
depends upon Q1, which is adjusted via the fuel
adjustment mechanisms. 
an 
CJP
2 will not, in general, be constant as P2 varies. 2 
We have seen that P2 is not independent of variables
in the fuel period which are adjusted by a FAM. 
The ambiguity of the effect of the joint FAM/Rate of 
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Return model on factor proportions is not surprising. This section
has already observed that, under some reasonable conditions, a FAM 
alone produces a pro-fuel bias, while a rate of return review alone
produces a bias favoring capital. It is the synergistic ambiguities
I 
which are perhaps the most surprising and interesting. � ·imp 
point to note is that, because the interactive effects aie Jf· 
uncertain sign, we cannot guarantee on a priori grounds, thlt 
both a FAM and a rate of return review will produce some "hjpp 
medium " in input choice. 
5. MULTIPERIOD EFFECTS ON REGULATORY BEHAVIOR 
rta 
sin 
ugh
the
Joskow claims that "the existence of these autbmattic 
adjustment clauses enabled most electric utilities to fllw jhr 
the rapidly increased cost of residual fuel oil resultink flom' 
Arab boyoo'' �d ino<e�ed OPEC p<io� wi<hou' 'he ne�•f i,J n 
Without the clauses, 1matiy lengthy formal rate of return review. 
companies in the northeast would have been driven to the l brinkl of 
bankruptcy if standard review procedures had to be followed j " 1[1974! 
To consider Joskow's claim in the context of t�e Jodels 
presented here, we observe that there are actually four 1isjin�t 
questions to be asked : 
1. If a utility has made a choice of capital prior i to, 
without the expectation of, a fuel cost adjustment lcl 
will granting a FAM increase the utility's expelteq p 
d 
use,
of it
2. If a utility has made a choice of capital prior lto,I amd 
without the expectation of, a fuel cost adjustment 'icl;t.use, 
will granting a FAM always result in higher ex Jost pfofits 
for any given period? 
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3. If a utility chooses capital will full knowledge about 
the way in which its FAM will operate, will it have greater 
expected profits than without the FAM? 
4. If a utility chooses capital with full knowledge about
the way in which its FAM will operate, will its choice 
of capital always lead to higher ex post prof its in every
period? 
Consider model A. Suppose that with the FAM the utility
chose an amount of capital K, which is equal to the amount of 
capital chosen without the FAM, K'. What is the difference in 
expected profits? 
E(1T)No FAM -
E(1T) FAM 
J
w(K') 
{PQ 
WO 
- w L - rK' }d<P
w(K) 
J {PQ(P) - w L - rK}d<P. WO 
Note that at w(K'), 1TNo FAM = O, but 1TFAM � 0 since demand
is inelastic, so w(K) > w(K'). Therefore, the difference in expected 
profits is : 
w(K') 
E(1T)FAM - E(1T)NO FAM = J {1TFAM-1TNO FAM}d<P +WO 
w(K) 
JA {1TFAM}d<P w(K') (5.
1)
�;1 I ww0:: w:: w(K), but for any w, > 0 
K=K=K' 
under an assumption of inelasticity of demand. Therefore both terms 
(5.1) �e no=egarive, �d expeored profire, given rhe ,.l, J., ral � 
are at least as high with the FAM as without. Therefore, I we ha e an11 
"yes " to questions (1) and (2) (given that �; > 0) as the ass1� ri=ll · 
identical capital choice is equivalent to the idea of adding t e F."-
after capital choice is made. 
I I A Furthermore, since the utility would diverge f,om l � K' 
only if it led to higher expected profits, we know that bhe F. 
leads to expected profits at least as great as in the abslencl df 
fuel cost pass throughs. This answers "yes" to question (3) l 
I The answer to question (4), however, is "in general, lno. 11 
We can show this with an extreme counterexample. Suppose [ thl utilim 
choice K' without a FAM, but K" with a FAM, because 
E(1T) I A > E(1T) I A • K=K" K=K' 
Now, let w be realized at w = w • Without the FAM the utiilitylfaces 
the same price and quantity req:irement as with the FAM. I Thl firm 
lativ may be struck with an ex post inefficient amount of capitial,1 r 
to the firm without access to a fuel adjustment mechanisJ. 
Likewise, consider model B. We only have to ndte that 
in the record period, the utility may be lowering profitj, b� 
inefficient choice of labor and capital. (This is analoJousl t 
.n 
.n 
ice,
red
31
Stewart's observation that, with a fixed coefficient production 
function, "when the change in factor mix precedes the liberalization 
of the fuel clause • • • the firm must weigh the additional losses it
must sustain during the period preceding the respecification of the 
fuel clause against the possible gains which can be achieved after 
the respecification." 
This leads directly to an integration of the concepts 
embodied in Models A and B. In Model A, a review comes automatically,
but if and only if the zero profit constraint is binding. In Model 
B, rate of return review comes at a fixed date, T. Suppose that the
firm may choose the time for a rate review with a known two period 
lag. That is, if at the end of time T the utility asks for a review,
it will receive the review in period T + 2. Furthermore, let the 
firm be operating, in the meantime, with a FAM such as in Model B.
pt 
Lo(wt -wO)Po+ Q 0 
(5.2) 
For simplicity, let the rate review in period T + 2 depend
only on data generated in periods O, T + 1 , and T + 2 (so that it is
independent of decisions made in periods 1 , 2, • • •  ,T). Then, in 
each period t = 1, 2, • . •  ,T 
E (1f t) E(PtQt - wtL� rK.). 
Under these assumptions, the firm will, in periods 1, 2, ... ,T, set
the common carrier constraint at strict equality, and L* = L(Qt,K).
I 
l r«d of 
 
Suppose the firm's decision rule is to ask for 
return review if actual profits in any period fall below some c us ta. 
(SJ 1ft < H. 
Suppose further that, in the absence of a FAM, the 
amount of capital K' so that it expects to ask for 
T*. For all periods t = 1 , 2, • • •  T*, if demand is 
profits 
E(irt) E(PtQt - wtLt - rK) 
firm chooses! an 
 I a revibw in 
inelaslic l 
e
::11 
will be at least as great if a FAM is in existence and th'e s
M 
amou 
of capital, K' is chosen. Therefore, for the same amount[ of l c Jpita � 
utilized, the firm will expect to go at least as long be�orela�king 
for a review when it is allowed a FAM. 
Furthermore, at K = K 1 , the same can be said ofi the � 
decision of the firm: ex post profits will always be at leakt las li llil 
So, thJ fiL 
I I iHowevar, 
great with a FAM as long as demand is inelastic. 
actually will go at least as long between rate reviews. 
when we allow the quantity of capital to diverge between lthel t�o 
circumstances, K � K', the optimal T* can vary and the caveat df 
questions (4) above still holds: ex post the firm may fJnd bhat 
it has lower profits than with a different capital choicj anh rto 
FAM, although, of course, the discounted stream·of expec ded �rdfits 
will be at least as great with a FAM as without. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CON CLUSION S 
Suspicions that fuel adjustment mechanisms distort input 
choices are justified. My results agree precisely (in the case of 
no fuel cost uncertainty) with other results proposing that there 
will be an incentive for utilities to invest in relatively more fuel 
intensive technologies than would be employed by a firm producing 
the same output . 
The addition of uncertainty does not eradicate the result
that input incentives are altered, however the interpretation of 
these biases as "pro-fuel" or "anti-fuel" becomes more difficult. 
In the 11Joskow11 model of Section 3, the utilization of the 
fuel adjustment mechanism will not, in general leave the bankruptcy 
level of fuel prices unchanged. Furthermore, through the FAM, output 
produced by .the firm is allowed to vary. These bankruptcy and "output " 
effects make it impossible to compare directly the resulting choice 
of technology for any realized fuel price level except when the fuel 
price levels at which the regulators step in are identical . 
In the interactive model of Section 4, we saw that acting 
alone, the fuel period FAM mechanism will yield a "pro-fuel " 
distortion (again, refer to Appendix 4) . When combined with a rate 
of return review price mechanism, the resulting situation results in 
a distinct alteration of input incentives viz-a-viz an institutionless 
world, but the interaction makes it impossible to describe the 
direction of the biases. I pointed out that there are synergistic effects 
which are more than simply a combination of the distortions seen when 
the FAM or rate of return review operates independently. 
Thus, electric utility regulators face somewhatl of la 
dilemma: on the one hand, Section 5 of this paper demonstrated 
the FAM can play a role in preserving the financial integkitJ o 
electric utilities without a massive overburdening of the relul 
process . On the other hand, this is obtained at a cost of I 
inefficiencies in input choices which, in some specific ckses, 
a relatively more fuel intensive technology. In addition l hlw 
regulators evaluate the potential that a FAM interacts wi bh lh 
that 
tor:>j 
ead 
poss"" 
"pro-capital" A-J biases, as suggested by Model B remains! an1opjen 
question . One application of the results presented here �s to 
the questions posed earlier regarding pollution control slrabe 
in Southern California. The results presented here indicltelt 
fuel adjustment clause must be considered as relevant to fhel d 
of Southern California utilities to rely more on the "fue[ int 
approach to meeting air quality standards. 
e 
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APPENDIX 1 
Since P is a function of 1 and w, for a given w we can 
ClQ Cl Q ClP state a derived demand Q(P(L)) = Q(L), with ClL = ClP ClL • For FAM 1, 
ClP w - WO 
a1 = � 
ClP_� For FAM 2, ClL - QO 
Since w � w0, and Cl Q thClP ' e
function has a nonpositive slope. 
1 
Q(P(L)) lw = w
'--��������� Q 
FIGURE 1-1 
Likewise, we can state the production 
a fixed level of K = K. 
1 
(F(K,L) 
Q 
FIGURE 1-2 
Figure 1-2 depicts diminishing returns to 1 
L* = L(K,w) will be defined by the intersection of the 
1 
--l<�����������Q 
As long as lim F(R,L) 
1-+«> 
FIGURE 1-3 
+ oo we can rule out cases such 
11 3 1 
fol! 
L 
Q (P (L)) 
--f������������- Q 
FIGURE 1-4 
where no intersection occurs. The proposition to be shown is that
the firm never has an incentive to move from L to L in Figure 1-5 
(the firm must stay "northeast" of Q(P, (L)) by the common carrier 
constraint). 
L 
:E - - - - -
FIGURE 1-5
F(K,L) 
Q(P(L)) lw = w 
Q 
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Suppose the firm is at L. To move to t, 
�L fuel, at a cost of w�L. The marginal cost 
usage is, therefore, w. The marginal revenue 
� ClP = � 
(w - wO) = ( Cl Q ) ( w - WO) ClP ClL ClP QO Q + p ClP � 
.£g_ (w-w0) The second term P ClP � is clearly 
necessary condition for increasing fuel to be 
(w-w0 ) .£g_ Q � � w. However, since ClP < O, Q < Q0, so 
JL (w-w )  < w-w0 < w Qo o 
--:><--
As long as w0 > 0. 
Likewise, for FAM 2, a necessary condition is that 
JL (w) > w • Qo 
A contradiction will obtain if � < 0 
� 
3II 
ad\ 
Cl Q 
ClP 
J 
i- wo\ 
Qo I 
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APPENDIX 2
It is no longer obvious that the function w(K) is well 
defined. Recall that w(K) (which may be + 00) is the level of fuel 
prices such that 
TI(K,w) < 0 Vw > w(K) 
n(K,w) > 0 Vw � w(K) 
What we need to avoid is a situation such as the following : 
n(K,w) 
o--l�-\,--�:rC-���-r---'��r---'>,;;::-� 
with a FAM, �: for any given level of capital can be expressed as 
an j = aR (aP .£1:. + aP ) _ L _ w .£1:. aw K = K ClP aL aw aw aw . 
First, we must find an expression for �;. To 
totally differentiate the common carrier constraint 
For FAM 1
so 
For FAM 2
so 
F(K,L(K,w)} = Q(P(w,L(K,w))). 
F .£b_ = .£g_ [_1:_ + w -wO aLJ L aw aP Q0 Q0 aw 
ClL 
aw = 
aQ J:.. aP Qo 
aqt_-_5:i\ FL - ClP \� 
F .£1:. = .£g_ u_ + .JI._ Cl L] L aw aP LQo Qo aw 
aL 
aw = 
aQ _1:_ 
ClP QO 
.£g_ .JI._ FL - aP QO
Note that both (A.2-2) and (A.2-3) are nonpositive. 
evaluate (A.2-1) using (A.2-3)
' 
CA! llll11-1) 
-2) 
-3) 
. �[ ��� 
d7f l = - [p �� + Q � F -�O w aw K = K L ()P Qo
which equals 
+-1:...] - L - w �o 
()Q J:... ()P QO 
�...::!... FL -aP QO
� 
� [...::!.._ � -1:_ + F _L _ J:... � w j 
P � + Q 
Qo aP Qo L Qo Qo aP '% 
()p � w F - -
�J:... aP Qo - L - w aQ ...::!... FL - ()p QO
or 
then 
L ()p QO 
. F -L QO -
L ] 
r � + � [FL -� QO 
()Q J:_ 3P Qo L - w aQ ...::!... FL - ()p QO
r_ � 1 I L 1 aQ w � L L aP + � �L Q;J - LFL + L aP Qo - w aP Qo 
�...::!... FL - CIP QO 
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(A.2-4) 
The sign of (A.2-4) will depend on the numerator, which 
simplifies to 
� � FL QLO + FL L [ t - ll 
(A.2-5) is unambiguously nonpositive since Q S Q0• Therefore, 
� S 0 Vw : w0, and w (K) is well defined for FAM 2. 
(A.2-5) 
Next consider FAM 1. Substitute (A.2-2) into 
get 
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to 
�� 
()p Qll Cl7f I = Clw K = K � � + � [f ;,·"l �� QL J 0 L _ � (w-w0)+ q FL CIP -Q-- O 0 I ii' I - L - lw : u_owo) � CIP 
which equals 
� �+ Ql [(�)�
�+�FL -� (� �1 L J _ � (w-w0) FL ()p 
- L 
that is 
[p � + �[ -�r-·,,l FL ()p w0 7 
Combining terms, we get 
CIQ +(lp 
Qo 
CIQ CIP 
<lQ- w <lP 
� ()P 
w I I �� llr:'I 
-6) 
The sign of (A.2-6) will be determined by the numerator, which
simplifies to 
or 
� L lJL J P aP Qo FL + LFLL Qo - 1 WQ �- Q ()P0
_.!:_ � - {_g__ \ QO ap (.PFL wO) + LFL \Qo lj
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(A.2-7) 
The second term is clearly nonpositive. The first term, 
however, may be positive or negative. Therefore, we cannot rule out 
a priori that w(K) is not well defined. However, we need not resort 
only to assuming the designed result for the entire range of fuel 
prices; we can work with a slightly weaker set of assumptions. Note 
that since 
L F 
" = il;; f-·,) > 0aw � -FL - aP QO 
a [P FL] > 0 aw 
Then we assume that 
if FLL < 0. 
1. Either (a) a some w* such that 
PFL I = WO w* 
(A.2-8) 
or (b) 
PFL I > WO WO 
2. If not (1) (b) above, then profits are nonnegatii 
Vw w0 < w < w*. 
If w(K) is not well defined for FAM 1, we musti t 
-
J 
I the concept of integrating from w0 to w(K) with n(w)d�(w) 
is the set of fuel prices for which the firm ear:s nonnlga 
and E is assumed to have positive measure. 
II 
II ff 
nlrepL 
I I w11tere E 
II vii! pro s, 
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APPENDIX 3 
Quantity or output effects can complicate the analysis of
input choice by regulated firms. This model is no exception. In 
fact, the quantity effects are especially bothersome since they occur
after the random variable is observed. For each different value of 
w, the FAM utility will be operating at a different level of output. 
As noted in the text, the other complicating factor with 
this model is what can be called the bankruptcy effect. The term w(k)
indicates the level of fuel wits at which the firm will be just 
earning zero profits. (Appendix 2 discusses the conditions under which
w (K) is well defined). The problem which arises in first 
order conditions is that w (Kz) will in general differ from w (is_). 
To demonstrate a little more simply the ambiguities which
are caused, consider the following special case. There are only two
states of the world 
w1 > w0 occurs with probability p 
w2 > w1 occurs with probability 1 - � 
Furthermore, suppose the following are true 
w2 > w(IS_) > wl > WO
w (K2) > w2 
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So that without a FAM, the firm earns positive profit at w{, Butlis 
bankrupt at w2• With FAM, the profit maximizing choice leJvesl tlie 
firm solvent in both cases. 
or 
Then, inequality 3.25 becomes 
F Kl wl FL C�:wl) 
.:: P,'Wl 
FK 2 
FL (K2,wl)
FK 2 + (1 - p)w2 FL (�2•"f2) ( 
E Kl 
Fl:,<Kl,wl) 
< R 
F K2 
FL (K.2 ,wl) 
+ (1 - p) 
FK ( w � - 1w1 2 + (1 - p) . . FL(r{2,w2) M '1 
c 
Because the third term on the right hand side of! (AJ3.:.l2) 
fa pooiti�, <he ineq=lity gi�a "' no info�<ion about <he l"'i1""1I magnitudes of the marginal rates of technical substitution !. Fur�hermrn 
the firm is producing a different quantity of output at eabh Jf �he 
three states (no FAM with w0• FAM with wl' and FAM with wl). I OP:ily a 
p 1 does the inequality 
FK 2 sign FL (K2 ,wl) 
FK 1 
FL (�,wk)
There is one construct in which one can control �orl ttte 
ou<pu< =d bankrup,cy effom. I will call <hie <he oucpuf ""''*"'" 
identical (ORI) firm. In our model, an ORI firm with respectltcl the 
FAM utility is any firm which produces the same output qualtity !give 
the same realization of the random variable, w. 
-1) 
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Consider the firm which is regulated to be ORI with respect 
to the FAM utility. Call this firm ORI2• ORI2 is given a price function 
p . ORiz • w + R 
with the following properties 
i) PORI is independent of .!!BY action taken by the ORI2 firm. 2 
hence 
ii) Vw WO < w < w (K2) 
PORI = PFAM 2 
Q(PORI ) = Q(PFAM)2 
Consider the conditions for expected profit maximization for 
the ORI2 firm restricted to the range w0 to w(K2) 
Max K3 
w<K2> J . {PQ - wL3 - rK3} d<l>
0 
The first order condition is 
r = 
·r1 w "�:} dip • 7"{ w> } . L3 0 0 
<i.>W(K2) <i.>W (K2) 
(A. 3-3) 
(A. 3-4) 
Which is precisely the condition for minimizing the expected 
costs in the range w0 to wJK2) for an ORI2 firm. 
J 
Thus, we can compare (A-3.4) to (3.19) to see l thtt lthe 
FAM utility departs from the input choices which would minim:ilze t 
cost of the particular output schedule the firm has cholen rjstric 
the range WO to w(K2). Furthermore, over some interval of p sitij, 
measure of fuel prices, this divergence entails an inef�ic�e tly ���h 
d 
F 
F
K and hence an inefficiently fuel intensive input mix. 
L 
APPENDIX 4 
(Proof of Proposition 1)
Lemma 1. With no FAM and no R/R, the firm will never produce more
than demand in the record period. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the firm chose K' and L' such that 
F(K', L') > Q . 0 By reducing fuel by �L, the firm loses nothing in
periods 1 and 2 and gains w0�L in period 0. 
Lemma 2.. (F- ) K If -FLO. FAM < { :�0 ) NO FAM
NO R/R
then the firm will use at least as much capital with the FAM. 
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Proof of Lemma 2. The firm must produce at least Q0 in the record 
period in either case. By Lemma 1, with neither FAM nor R/R, the firm 
will produce exactly Q0• Therefore, with the FAM the firm produces 
at least as much as in the institutionless case. If it used less 
capital, it would have to use more fuel, and (f )FAM would be less
.o 
than (f0) NO FAM • Employing homotheticity leads to a contradiction 
NO R/R 
of the original supposition.
Lemma 3.
then 
If -(FK ) FLO FAM < . (:�J NO FAM
K2 < K2 
NO R/R
(
F-
) (
F-
) FL2 FAM FL2 NO FAM
NO R/R
't/w2 
Proof of Lemma 3. Since the firm gets a review in neither lca$e, i
S. I ince resources 
are costly, it will produce exactly Q(P2) and not "goldllaje"I fueli. 
Therefore, L2 FAM. :'.: L2 L JAM 
must produce at least Q(P2) in both cases. 
By Lemma 2, �AM :: �o FAM 
NO R/R 
and (¥2) FAM
homotheticity. 
> (�2 ) NO FAM
NO R/R
NO �/R 
t I The result follows from 
Proof of the Proposition • From the main text, we know rlhatl att leas 
one of the following is true: 
i) r:K ) > (:K ) �Lo FAM Lo NO FAMNO R/R
[A1E1 ( wl ::l - r) ( F- - r)] No FAM+ A2E2 w2 �L2
No R/R
< [A E (w FK - r) 1 1 1 FL 1 + A2E2 (w2 ::2 - ')] FAM
K If i) holds, then Io FAM 
< K Io NO FAMNO R/R 
by homotheticity. Using this and Lemma 1 gives us that L0 FAM > 
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( 4.11) 
LO NO FAM
NO R/R
This is the second part of (1). If (ii) is true, since w2 and r are 
unaffected, Lemma 3 says that 
Al El 
F­K 
(w1 � :._ r) Ll 
> Al El 
F-
(w l F
K - r) 
Ll 
which reduces to (2) of the· proposition. 
I 1. 
2. 
3. 
[I 
sl 
FOOTNOTES 
While working on this paper, I became aware of similar rejearc� 
being conducted by �tewart [1977], Cowing and Stevenlon [ 978]j 
and Baron and De Bandt [1978]. The work presented hlre d.fferl 
from all three primarily with regards to the models [of th 
regulatory process which are incorporated. 
ncrea These two formulas are different ways of allowing for an 
in "average fuel costs". Both use the output of pejiodl 0 
base. However, FAM 1 adjusts price to reflect the Jhangelin 
expenditures necessary to purchase the current amoult Jf 
FAM 2 reflects, instead, the change in total fuel elpejdi 
uel.
as a 
ures
from period 0 to period 1. 
In an A-J rate of return model, the first and second oride 
conditions for the profit maximizing firm are inconlisJen 
the firm operating in the inelastic part of the damlnd !cu 
 No such inconsistency arises in the "rate review " of mdde 
The price formula 
p2 
w2 L1 + sK 
Ql 
wit
ve.
B.
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is not that of an A-J instantaneous rate review, which would be 
p2 
w2 L2 + sK
Q2 .  
In fact once period 2 has arrived, the model B firm can do 
nothing more to alter price, and fuel must be purchased to satisfy
F(K, L2) Q(P2). 
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